Despite the relatively higher frequency of job displacement among older workers in Europe, little is known on its effect on the work-retirement decision. Employing individual data from the European Community Household Panel, for a number of countries with differences in their institutional environments, the effect of job displacement for non-employed workers is identified separately for the transitions into re-employment and retirement. The findings suggest that in countries with relatively more generous unemployment insurance provisions for older unemployed, which offer a pathway to early retirement, older displaced workers exhibit lower re-employment and higher retirement rates compared to the non-displaced. These results are robust to dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity and to the endogeneity of displacement.
Introduction
This paper investigates how job displacement that leads to non-employment affects the transitions into re-employment and retirement in a competing-risks hazard framework for a number of European countries, which face different institutional rules. In recent years, there is evidence of an increase in the frequency of job loss among older workers both in the U.S. (Farber et al., 1997; Farber, 2004) and in Europe (OECD, 1998) . 2 Despite this development, which has been associated with demand shifts, restructuring of traditional industries, import competition and out-sourcing of jobs, surprisingly very little is known on how job displacement might affect the labour market transitions of older workers and, in particular, the work-retirement decision. Understanding the link between job displacement and retirement has direct implications for policies promoting longer working lives. These policies are considered as a response to the decline in the labour force participation of older workers and the demographic changes that occur in European countries, which put pressure on the sustainability of the social security systems.
In theory, the direction of the effect of job loss towards re-employment or retirement is ambiguous. Experiencing a job loss may have considerable consequences because of the interruption of a long tenure job, which diminishes acquired firm-specific human capital, employment and earning prospects. Indeed, studies focusing on workers of all ages find that job displacement leads to a reduction of future earnings (Jacobson et al., 1993; Ruhm, 1991) and an increase of employment instability (Stevens, 1997) , in the sense that the displaced have higher exit rates from subsequent employment. 3 Although the unemployment rate among workers 45 to 64 years old is lower than the overall rate in most OECD countries, the incidence of long-term unemployment is significantly higher (OECD, 1998) , suggesting a lower mobility of older workers who experience unemployment. Considering retirement as a distinct labour market state allows to distinguish between two competing explanations for the incidence of long-term unemployment among older workers. That is, unemployment persistence might exist due to 1) difficulties to be reemployed based on poor employment prospects, or 2) due to disincentives to be re-employed. The combination of extended unemployment benefit periods with early retirement schemes available for the older workers, in a number of countries, might affect their decisions by making retirement more attractive (Duval, 2003) . 4 However, job displacement might also affect the work-retirement decision on the opposite direction; reducing wealth and income, which might lead to an extension of the working life.
Focusing on the transitions between non-employment and employment following a late-career job loss in the U.S., Stevens (1999, 2001) find that a job loss for men leads to longer labour force participation reflecting the need to rebuild diminished savings for retirement. For women, the reduced earnings due to a job loss reduce the incentives to work. Using Austrian administrative data, Ichino et al. (2007) find that after a plant closure initially the old have lower re-employment probabilities as compared to prime-age workers but later they catch-up.
The analysis in this paper has three novel and important features. The first is the focus on the distinction between transitions towards re-employment and retirement for older workers in a number of countries (Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K.), which differ in their institutions related to older unemployed, based on individual panel data from the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP, 1994 (ECHP, -2001 . In this respect, the paper contributes to a relatively recent literature on the incentive effects of unemployment related benefits for older workers. Heyma and Van Ours (2005) find that the abolition of the requirement to actively search for a job beyond age 57.5 and the entitlement to unemployment benefits until the age of 65, in the Netherlands, has a large negative effect on the job finding rate. Other studies have shown that increases in the entitlement period of unemployment benefits for older workers leads to declines in transition rates to employment in Germany (Hunt, 1995) and Austria (Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004) , and provide a quantitatively important pathway into early retirement (Lalive, 2008) . Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) , evaluating the increase in the eligibility age from 53 to 55 of the unemployment insurance system in Finland, which allows unemployed workers to collect benefits up to a certain age limit and then retire, find evidence of a large decrease in the inflow to unemployment and a large increase in the transition rate out of unemployment to employment.
The second novel feature of the paper is the joint estimation of the effects of job displacement on the transitions to and out of subsequent employment, distinguishing between the short and longrun effects of displacement. That is, although displaced workers might be re-employed relatively fast, what is important for the overall employment rate is also the stability of the post-displacement employment. In addition, dynamic selection is taken into account by allowing unobserved individual characteristics to be correlated across states.
Finally, the paper addresses the endogeneity of displacement by extending the econometric model into a joint estimation of the selection process into displacement and the transitions into employment or retirement. Based on the "timing of the events" approach of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) , the causal effect of displacement is identified by means of the variation from the multiple non-employment and employment spells, which are observed for each individual.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of the institutional features related to unemployment insurance and retirement rules in each of the countries considered in this study. Section 3 describes the data and provides a non-parametric analysis of labour market transitions. Section 4 presents the econometric model and discusses identification and the way to address the endogeneity of displacement. Section 5 discusses the results of the effect of displacement on labour market transitions, and the last section provides a summary of the findings and some policy conclusions.
Institutional Features
The focus of this section is on the institutions which are related to older unemployed in the four countries considered in the analysis. These refer to the unemployment insurance and early retirement schemes based on information obtained from the Mutual Information System on Social
Protection (MISSOC, 2001 ) of the European Commission. Tables A1 and A2 summarize the major policy instruments in each country distinguishing between provisions that are available to the general public from those who are only available to the older workers.
In Germany, the legal retirement age is 60 after 180 contribution months if unemployed at the commencement of the pension and if unemployed for 52 weeks after completion of the age of 58.5.
Alternatively, the requirement is to have worked part time for older workers for 24 calendar months. The age limit for early pension for unemployed increased in the years 1997 to 2001 from 60 to 65 years. However, the pensions can be claimed after the completion of the age of 60 with the acceptance of pension reductions. The replacement rate for unemployment insurance recipients is 67 per cent of net earnings (60 per cent for beneficiaries without children). The duration of benefits is 32 months for workers aged 54 and over.
In Spain, there is no direct provision of early retirement for unemployed. However, early retirement is possible at the age of 60 with an 8% reduction for every anticipated retirement year.
With respect to benefits for older unemployed, under the Industrial Restructuring law, workers are entitled to a form of benefit financed under the relevant restructuring plan. These benefits are of particular significance for workers aged at least 55 at the time of restructuring, who may draw them until they reach 65 years of age. The replacement rate for unemployment insurance recipients is 70
per cent for the first 180 days, and 60 per cent afterwards. The duration of unemployment benefits received varies between 4 months and 2 years depending on the contribution period over the preceding 6 years. For long-term unemployed, aged 45 or more, there is a special 6-months benefit of 75-125 per cent of minimum wage.
In Italy, there are no special benefits for older unemployed which are associated with the possibility of early retirement. The legal retirement age is 63 for men and 58 for women. Early pension is available at the age of 54 and after 35 years of contributions, or after 36 years of contributions regardless of age. Early retirement is possible for employees of companies in economic difficulties at the latest 5 years before normal retirement age. The replacement rate for the ordinary unemployment benefits is 30% of the average pay received during the last 3 months, and the duration is 180 days. The replacement rate for the special unemployment benefit for those in the building industry is 80% of previous earnings with duration of 90 days.
Finally, in the U.K. there are no provisions of early retirement and no benefits related to older unemployed. The standard unemployment insurance rate is a flat rate of about 80 euros per week for aged 25 or over, with duration up to 12 months limited to 182 days in any job-seeking period in
October 1996.
To summarize, in Germany, and Spain, institutions are designed to assist older unemployed and displaced, while in Italy, and the U.K., such provisions are not in general available. It is worth mentioning that this does not preclude special schemes with incentives for early retirement, for instance, in Italy. However, these are case-specific and do not have a general applicability.
Stylized Facts and Data
Figure 1 depicts some stylized facts on the recent patterns in unemployment and displacement for workers by age. The left graph shows the unemployment rate for workers aged 16-50 and 50-64 in the EU-15 countries for the period 1995-2007. The first fact to notice is the lower unemployment rate for older workers, although they face higher incidence of long-term unemployment (OECD, 1998) . There are two peaks in the unemployment rate observed in 1997 and in 2004, with a decline in between, which is faster for the younger workers. The right graph shows the displacement rate as a percentage of employment. The risk of displacement is higher for the older workers and exhibits two peaks (in 1997 and 2004) while for the younger workers we observe a declining rate from 1995 until 2001. Overall, displacement is affecting proportionally more the older workers and for the time period that this paper considers (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) ) the unemployment and the displacement rates exhibited their highest values.
The analysis of the effect of displacement on the labour market transitions of older workers is based on individual data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1994 (ECHP, -2001 Blau and Riphahn (1999) when the missing months are less, or equal to three. 5 The analysis allows for multiple non-employment spells. 5 The missing information is replaced with the value of the month before the missing when the values are the same before and after the missing month. With different values, the imputation depends on the number of missing months. Missing information is replaced with the value of the month after the missing month when the missing month is only one. With two missing months, the first missing value is replaced with the value of the previous month and the second missing value is replaced with the value of the next month. With three missing values, the first missing month is Table 1 shows the number of individuals in the data that are observed making a direct transition from employment to retirement by age groups. Compared to the number of spells entering into nonemployment, the direct spells to retirement are relatively few and are not considered further in the analysis as retirement is an absorbing state. That is, the focus of the analysis is on the transitions out of non-employment.
[ Table 1 about here] replaced with the value of the previous to month, while the other two missing months are replaced with the value of the month after the missing months. 6 The paper is focused on Germany, Italy, Spain, and U.K., as for the other countries in the ECHP the inflow sample was relatively small resulting in very few transitions especially towards retirement. As the focus of the paper is on the distinction between transitions to re-employment and retirement this selection was inevitable. However, as discussed in section 2, the four countries studied offer interesting variation in institutional characteristics, representing different welfare regimes.
[ Table 2 about here]
For each of the non-employment spells an indicator of displacement is constructed using the information on the reason for leaving the previous job. The displaced are defined as those who were obliged to stop the previous job by the employer. [ Table 3 about here] Except for Germany, older individuals with medium education are more likely to be displaced. For the other characteristics, no clear pattern seems to exist across countries. Table 4 also presents summary statistics for the spells that are dropped due to missing information on the reason for leaving the previous job, which is used for constructing the displacement dummy. The individuals that are dropped due to missing information are on average somewhat older, with lower education in Germany and Italy and higher education in Spain and the U.K., and worse health in Germany, Spain and the U.K.
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[ Table 4 about here]
The advantage of using survey data compared to administrative data is that the sample is more representative of the whole population of displaced workers. With administrative data displacement 7 Overall, although some differences appear in the average characteristics between the included and the missing spells in terms of age, education and health, there is no evident systematic pattern across the groups of countries (Germany and Spain vs. Italy and U.K.) that might be driving the results.
is defined using information on plant closures which excludes all involuntary job separations that occur on an individual basis. Moreover, with survey data a control group can be defined out of those who voluntarily left their previous job (for a better job, marriage, child birth, looking after others, illness, etc.). However, using survey data has the disadvantage of relying on self-reported information for the reason of job separation, which might be correlated with individual unobserved characteristics, or be endogenous to labour market institutions. For instance, quits might be reported as layoffs for the worker to be eligible for unemployment insurance, or layoffs to be reported as quits to avoid administrative burden on the side of the employer in countries with strict employment protection legislation. In addition, even in the case of plant closing, the workers who remain until the plant closes are selected non-randomly from the group of workers who were present when the firm's initial negative demand shocks arrived. This occurs as the firm learns which employees are likely to quit and alters its layoff policies accordingly (Pfann and Hamermesh, 2001 ). Figure 2 shows the proportion of non-employed who re-enter employment by displacement status.
Empirical Hazard Estimates
The cumulative failure is based on the empirical (Kaplan-Meier) hazard rates and is equal to one minus the survival rate. In Germany, Italy and Spain, non-displaced workers return to employment faster compared to those displaced, while the opposite holds for the U.K. One possible reason for the higher re-employment of displaced workers in the U.K might be the high share of workers who have left their previous job for obtaining a better or more suitable job, as shown in Table 2 . These workers who are classified as non-displaced are expected to stay unemployed longer until they find a better match.
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 shows the cumulative failure from non-employment to re-employment for the displaced by age groups. In Germany, and Spain, there is a big difference across age groups in the proportion of 8 The way to address the endogeneity of displacement is discussed in Section 4.1.
displaced workers who return to employment. While for those aged 45-54 more than 60 per cent eventually return to employment, it is only about 40 per cent of those older displaced (aged 55-64) who are re-employed. For Italy and the U.K., such differences by age are smaller. These figures suggest that, for workers in Germany and Spain, displacement past a certain age (around 55 years old) is not "repaired".
[ Figure 3 about here] Figure 4 depicts the proportion of workers who exit subsequent employment. It shows that in all countries, among the non-employed workers who are re-employed, those who have entered into non-employment due to displacement exhibit a lower exit rate.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Although differences in re-employment and subsequent employment hazards between displaced and non-displaced are useful, they are not informative on the transitions towards other states, and in particular, retirement. Moreover, such differences might be confounded by individual observed and unobserved characteristics, or dynamic selection which might arise as workers with higher employability are expected to leave non-employment faster and obtain more stable employment. To address these issues, an adequate econometric model is required.
Econometric Methodology
The econometric analysis is based on a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model. In line with most applications analyzing individual's labour market transitions a reduced-form approach is adopted (see Van den Berg (2001) for an overview of duration models).
The Statistical Model
The analysis considers the effect of job loss on the transitions from non-employment ( ) and from subsequent employment ( ), for those who are re-employed. Non-employed workers have the following options: accept a job offer and be re-employed ( ne ne e e − ), or retire ( ). The transitions ne r − from non-employment to employment or retirement are modelled in a competing-risks framework.
The transitions from subsequent employment are modelled as a single-risk due to lack of sufficiently large sample that would allow a distinction to be made between re-entering unemployment and retiring. Observations for individual who remain non-employed until the end of the observation period are treated as right-censored.
Each hazard function is the product of the baseline hazard, , which captures the time dependence of the hazard rate and the systematic part, ex , which shifts the baseline hazard and is defined as ( )
where i refers to the individual, , and denotes the spells for each individual. ,
For the non-employment spells, where j ne = , the index 
The systematic part includes also individual characteristics and economic variables denoted as jik X . The observed characteristics refer to the year in which each spell has started and are fixed within a spell. However, they are allowed to vary across non-employment and employment states and across multiple spells for e individual. The variables include age dummies, education dummies (defined using the ISCED classification), whether the individual is married, the number of children, non-labour income ba on capital and property income acting as a proxy for wealth, and a homeownership dummy. ach sed nt ent, the model is extended to a joint estim nd (4) where 9 The economic variables include the regional unemployment rate at the time of entering non-employme or employment, respectively. 10 The baseline hazard has a semi-parametric representation using a piece-wise constant function with specified month intervals for 1-6 months of duration, for 7-12 months, for 13-24 months and for more than 24 months.
In order to account for the endogeneity of displacem ation of the selection process in displacement and the transitions out of non-employment a employment. The selection process, which is specified as a logit model, is defined as Bover et al. (2002) , who consider a univariate model of unemployment duration, and to the treatment of initial conditions by Ham and LaLonde (1996) in their evaluation of training on a multivariate model of unemployment and employment spells.
Combining the contributions of the completed spells to re quent employment, the censored spells and selection process in equation (4), the total contribution to the likelihood for each individual can be written as
9 Questions about job tenure are asked in the ECHP at a yearly basis (at the time of each interview) and not at each month. Since the spells are based on the monthly calendar, the tenure variable includes many missing values reducing the sample considerably. Therefore, it is not included in the regressors. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is able to capture the effect of tenure as individuals with higher employability are more likely to obtain a good job match and experience longer job tenure. 10 Year dummies are also included which capture wide economic effects and the effect of policy changes (e.g. Germany). Given the data limitation, an investigation of the effect of policy changes is left for future research based on administrative data. 
ometric model is to identify the causal effect of displacement on the ut
Identification
The purpose of the econ transitions out of non-employment and subsequent employment. The model includes a competingrisks part which distinguishes between transitions from non-employment to employment, or retirement. Identification of a competing-risks proportional hazard model has been shown by Heckman and Honore (1989) . In the multivariate duration model, which includes the transitions o of subsequent employment, dynamic selection is controlled for by allowing the unobserved 11 The likelihood contributions for the transitions are defined in detail in Tatsiramos (2007). characteristics to be correlated across the non-employment and employment spells. A detailed discussion of such dynamic selection can be found in the study by Ham and LaLonde (1996) .
The identification of the displacement effect (treatment) relies on the identification of treatment effects on duration models by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) . Using the variation and randomness in the timing of the treatment and controlling for selection into treatment based on unobservables, they show that the causal treatment effect is identified without the need of exclusion restrictions. The assignment into treatment embeds a competing-risks model that does not involve the treatment. Empirical applications which exploit the "timing of events" approach can be found in Bonnal et al. (1997) , Abbring et al, (2005) , Lalive et al. (2005 Lalive et al. ( , 2008 and Van den Berg et al. (2004) .
For the purpose of this paper, the assignment into treatment is reduced to the probability model in (4), in which the probability to be displaced is defined as
where d θ and q θ denote the probability to exit the previous employment due to displacement or quit, respectively. Identification of this model relies on observing multiple non-employment and employment spells for each individual, which provide variation on the displacement indicator. As with the linear panel data, observing multiple outcomes for given unobserved heterogeneity values can be exploited to deal with unobserved heterogeneity under conditions that are mild relative to the single-spell case (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003) . By allowing unobserved heterogeneity in the selection equation to be correlated with the transition equations, the selection effect is identified separately from the causal effect of the treatment. As an example of such selection, one can think of individuals who are more likely to be displaced and also less likely to be re-employed because of unobserved differences in their labour market attachment.
Identification is also based on two assumptions related to anticipation and announcement effects. The non-anticipation assumption requires that individuals do not adjust their behaviour inducing displacement by knowing the future retirement date. The announcement effect is related to the situation, in which agents, knowing about a future job loss in advance might retire immediately or might postpone any action and retire after being laid off. The dependence of pension benefits on employment and earnings in the years before retirement, or the requirement for a number of years of contributions for pension eligibility, reduces the incentives to retire earlier in case of the announcement effect. Moreover, modelling the probability to be displaced conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics and allowing this probability to be correlated with the transitions to re-employment, or retirement, captures the selection that might occur in the case of inducing, or postponing, displacement due to announcement and anticipation effects.
Empirical Results
The econometric model is estimated under three different set of assumptions. The first assumes that there is no unobserved heterogeneity so transitions across states are independent and displacement is also exogenous. The second allows for correlated unobserved heterogeneity treating displacement as exogenous, while the third relaxes both assumptions of independent transitions and the exogeneity of displacement. Each of these models is estimated also by including interactions of the displacement dummy with age groups, in order to capture age dependent effects of displacement on the transitions across labour market states. Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates for the displacement dummy and for duration dependence from the model without controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity, assuming displacement is exogenous. Estimates from the first panel, for the transitions from non-employment to employment, show that displaced workers in Germany, Italy and Spain, are significantly less likely to be re-employed compared to the non-displaced. The effect of being displaced is positive, but not significant for the U.K. The second panel of Table 4 , for the transitions from non-employment to retirement, shows that displaced workers in Italy and the U.K. are less likely to retire compared to the non-displaced. The effect is significant at the 5 per cent level only for Italy.
The Effect of Displacement
On the other hand, in Spain, individuals who have been displaced are significantly more likely to retire. The third panel of Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates for the transition out of subsequent employment. In all countries, the coefficients of displacement exhibit a negative sign, but they are not significantly different from zero. These estimates under the independence assumption suggest that the non-employed workers who have been displaced seem to face lower probabilities to be reemployed, while the effect of displacement on the retirement decision is rather mixed, positive for Spain, negative for Italy and the U.K., and zero for Germany.
[ Table 5 The results in Table 5 , taking into account unobserved heterogeneity, show a similar pattern for the effect of displacement as with the model in which the transitions are assumed to be independent. The effect is larger indicating a downward bias if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, and a comparison of the likelihood values reveals an improvement in the fit of the model.
[ Table 6 about here]
In the empirical application with two points of support for each of , e r ne ne , ε ε and e ε , and an unrestricted correlation, the empirical results implied perfect correlation. So, the model was estimated under perfect correlation between the error terms. For identification, the first mass point is normalized to zero as there is a constant term in the vector of covariates so the second mass point can be interpreted as the deviation from the first. Therefore, six parameters are identified and one probability. This means, conditional on the observed characteristics and the time spent in the current spell, there are two types of individuals that differ in their non-employment hazard (high/low) towards re-employment and retirement, and their employment hazard (high/low). The heterogeneity mass points indicate the presence of one group in Italy and Spain with a lower hazard towards reemployment and out of subsequent employment, and a higher hazard towards retirement. For
Germany and the U.K., the heterogeneity distribution seems to affect mostly the transitions out of subsequent employment. Finally, the pattern of duration dependence is also similar between the two models, although the effect is smaller in the model with unobserved heterogeneity, which is expected due to the dynamic selection discussed above.
The Effect of Displacement by Age
To investigate the extent to which the displacement effect differs by age, the displaced dummy is interacted with age groups as is described in (2) and (3) of Section 4.1. Specification 2, in Table 7 , refers to the case in which the displaced dummy is interacted with the age groups 45-54 and 55-60, so the main effect refers to the displaced above 60 years old. The cut-off points of the age groups at 55 and 60 are chosen so that they match as close as possible with the institutional features, as described in section 2. For instance, in Germany, workers 55 years old and above can draw unemployment benefits for a longer period of time and they can retire if unemployed at age of 60.
In Italy, workers can retire at 55 after 35 years of contributions. At the same time, these cut-off points allow for sufficient variation for the estimation of the model. With the existing data it is not possible to perform the estimation with interactions of the displacement dummy with each age, so broader age groups need to be defined.
The first step in the analysis is to investigate the main effects of age both for the displaced and the non-displaced. The coefficient estimates from Table 7 suggest that younger workers (aged 45-54) are more likely to be re-employed and less likely to retire compared to the workers above 60 in all countries. This evidence is consistent with the observed patterns from a number of countries that older workers experience longer non-employment periods (Kuhn, 2002; OECD, 1998) . This might reflect that older workers are less adaptable to change than younger workers or that due to specific occupation and industry skills they experience less job opportunities and they might spend longer searching for a job. The higher transition to retirement for older workers is also consistent with evidence of higher labour force withdrawal.
The role of institutions such as unemployment insurance and provisions for retirement is also important and might produce differential effects across countries. In Germany, for instance, the reemployment probability for workers aged 55-60 is lower and the retirement probability is higher.
This can be explained by the increased generosity of the unemployment benefits system for workers within this age group and the eligibility for early retirement at age 60 if unemployed for 52 weeks after completion of the age of 58.5 years. Therefore, unemployed workers in this age group seem to face incentives due to the institutional structure to postpone re-employment until they become eligible for early retirement. This postponement effect can explain the negative coefficient for the re-employment probability for the age group 55-60. For Italy, we also observe a higher retirement probability for non-employed workers 55 years old and above. This seems to be related to the provision for retirement at age 55 after 35 years of contribution.
[ Table 7 about here] The next step is to consider whether there exist differential age effects for the displaced workers. For the younger age group (45-54) there is a small negative effect of being displaced on the transitions to re-employment. For Germany and Spain, this negative effect of displacement on re-employment is higher for the older displaced (55+) compared to the non-displaced. In addition, in these two countries the displaced workers above 60 years old exhibit a significant higher transition to retirement. These findings suggest that the institutional arrangements which provide relatively more generous unemployment insurance for older unemployed with the possibility of early retirement at age 60 for the insured unemployed affect the behaviour of the displaced workers differentially from the non-displaced creating disincentives to be re-employed until become eligible for early retirement around age 60.
Older displaced -above 55 years old -in Italy are less likely to exit non-employment both towards re-employment and retirement. 13 That is, contrary to Germany and Spain, an increased exit rate of older displaced workers towards retirement is not found for Italy. Finally, for the U.K., being displaced does not seem to have a significant effect on the exit rate from non-employment either towards re-employment or retirement.
Results with Endogenous Displacement
The discussion so far is based on the assumption that displacement is exogenous and uncorrelated to unobserved heterogeneity. However, workers might decide to quit instead of being laid-off due to an announcement effect, or there might be unobserved characteristics that make them more likely to be laid-off than others. To the extent that these characteristics affect also their transitions across labour market states might lead to biased estimates. Table 8 shows the estimates for the transitions from non-employment to employment or retirement and the transitions out of subsequent employment for both specifications (for the overall displacement effect and by age).
13 Both effects are larger for the age group 55-60.
For Germany and Spain, even after accounting for the endogeneity of displacement, older displaced are less likely to be re-employed and more likely to exit to retirement. The effect towards retirement is significant and positive for Germany in specification 2, which refers to the displaced above 60 years old. For Spain, a positive effect is also found although the effect is not as precisely estimated as in the model without taking into account the endogeneity of displacement. For Italy and the U.K., displaced workers do not differ in their likelihood to be re-employed compared to the non-displaced in specification 1. While for the U.K. these results are similar to the ones in Table 7 , taking into account the endogeneity of displacement changes the negative and significant effect for
Italy to a positive, but insignificant. As for the transitions to retirement, displaced workers in these two countries are less likely to exit to retirement.
[ Table 8 about here]
Overall, these results show that there are clearly two different patterns on the effect of displacement. In Germany and Spain, displaced workers exhibit lower re-employment and higher retirement rates compared to the non-displaced. To the contrary, in Italy and the U.K., the reemployment rates do not differ between the two groups of workers, but the displaced exhibit lower transitions rates towards retirement. These patterns suggest a role of the different institutions that prevail across countries, with the availability of unemployment related benefits (in Germany and Spain) offering a pathway to early withdrawal from the labour market, which coincides with longer unemployment spells.
Regarding the transitions out of subsequent employment, Table 8 shows differences in the effect of displacement compared to the model in which displacement is assumed to be exogenous.
In particular, the effect is negative and significant for displaced workers in Germany. This is consistent with the potential beneficial effect of relatively more generous benefits on the subsequent employment stability, as workers have the time to obtain a more suitable job (Tatsiramos, forthcoming) . For Spain and Italy, to the contrary, previously displaced workers are significantly more likely to exit their subsequent employment spell. Without allowing for correlation in the unobserved determinants of the displacement probability and the transitions, the effect was negative. The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity shows for Italy and Spain, in particular, the presence of a group with a lower propensity to experience displacement and higher transitions into and out of employment. Due to data limitations, it is not possible to distinguish whether these subsequent transitions are directed towards re-entering unemployment or exiting to retirement.
Possible reasons for these higher exit rates from subsequent employment might be the use of fixed term contracts in Spain and the provision for retirement at age 55 after 35 years of contribution in Italy. That is, a displaced worker might have an incentive -in the absence of generous benefits -to find a job in order to reach the minimum contribution years for becoming eligible for retirement.
Finally, Table 9 shows the transition specific coefficient estimates of specification 1 for the individual characteristics including the ones for the equation of the probability to be displaced. As expected, being young and educated increases the likelihood to be re-employed. Experiencing health problems appears to lower the chances of re-employment, while the number of children lowers the transitions to retirement.
[ Table 9 about here]
Conclusion
The labour market situation of older workers has become extremely important in the recent years.
Population ageing is expected to increase the share of older workers in the labour force, while displacement due to technological progress and restructuring of traditional industries affects disproportionately older workers. Despite these developments, very little is known on how job displacement might affect the work-retirement decision. This paper investigates the effect of job displacement for workers aged 45-64 years old on the labour market transitions in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K., based on individual data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1994 (ECHP, -2001 . To understand the factors and the incentives that determine the behaviour of older workers, a multivariate competing-risks hazard model is estimated which considers the transitions out of non-employment to re-employment and to retirement. Explicitly modelling the transitions to retirement allows to distinguish among two competing explanations for the low reemployment rates of older displaced workers. That is, difficulties to be re-employed vs. the lack of incentives to be re-employed if unemployment can be used as a pathway to early retirement. The model also distinguishes between the short and long term effects of job loss by analyzing the transitions from the post-displacement employment state taking into account correlated unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of displacement.
The results suggest that there are differential effects of displacement by age. In particular, in
Germany and Spain the non-employed workers are less likely to be re-employed if they are displaced when they are above 55 years old and they are more likely to retire after age 60 compared to the non-displaced. In contrast, in Italy and the U.K. older displaced are less likely to exit to retirement. Institutional differences across countries might explain these findings. In particular, the relatively generous unemployment insurance for involuntary unemployed in Germany and Spain, with the possibility to retire as early as 60 years old, might create incentives not to return to employment for those below age 60, and for an early withdrawal from the labour market for those above 60. In contrast, the lack of substantial unemployment insurance and of early retirement provisions for the displaced in countries such as, Italy and the U.K., seem not to create incentives for an early exit from the labour force. Instead, displaced workers return to employment faster than the non-displaced, although this effect is not statistically significant.
These findings suggest that the institutional environment is important and it produces differential effects on the behaviour of older workers. This has important policy implications for the necessary reforms as a response to the demographic changes that occur in European countries and the pressure they place on the social security systems. In particular, policies aiming at increasing the employment rates of older workers should take into account the higher frequency of job displacement among older workers and the role of labour market institutions that affect their reemployment probabilities. Efforts to lower the incidence of job displacement among older workers and increase their re-employment probabilities are interrelated through the institutional design. As suggested by Blanchard and Tirole (2008) unemployment insurance and employment protection should be designed jointly rather in isolation. Severance payments linked to the wage profile of workers can lower the incidence of job displacement while at the same time unemployment insurance being conditional on search and acceptance of available jobs can reduce the disincentive effect of insurance and thus increase job finding rates. -10,627.71 -12,361.44 Notes: The model distinguishes between transition from non-employment to employment, or retirement, and transitions out of subsequent employment for those re-employed. Estimations are performed separately by country. Apart from the dummy for being displaced, other controls include dummies for age, education, marital status, number of children, health status, home ownership, non-labor income, gender, regional unemployment rate and year dummies. Duration dependence is captured by group duration dummies with duration from 1 to 6 months being the reference group. The model distinguishes between transition from non-employment to employment, or retirement, and transitions out of subsequent employment for those re-employed. Estimations are performed separately by country. The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be discrete with each transition specific factor having two points of support. In the estimation with unrestricted correlation the results suggested perfect correlation, so one probability is estimated. Apart from the dummy for being displaced, other controls include dummies for age, education, marital status, number of children, health status, home ownership, non-labor income, gender, regional unemployment rate and year dummies. Duration dependence is captured by group duration dummies with duration from 1 to 6 months being the reference group. Notes: The model distinguishes between transition from non-employment to employment or retirement and transitions out of subsequent employment for those re-employed. Specification 2 includes interactions of the displacement dummy with age group dummies 45-54 and 55-60. The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be discrete with each transition specific factor having two points of support. Estimations are performed separately by country including year dummies. In the estimation with unrestricted correlation, the results suggested perfect correlation, so one probability is estimated. Apart from the dummy for being displaced and age, other controls include dummies for education, marital status, number of children, health status, home ownership, non-labor income, gender, and regional unemployment rate. Duration dependence is captured by group duration dummies with duration from 1 to 6 months being the reference group. Both duration dependence coefficients and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity are not reported as they are similar with Table 6 . Notes: See notes in Table 7 . The model is extended by estimating the probability to be displaced. The unobserved factor is allowed to be correlated with the transition equations. At Age of 60 after 180 contribution months if unemployed at the commencement of the pension and if unemployed for 52 weeks after completion of the age of 58.5 years At age 60 after 180 contribution months, if they were compulsorily insured for more than ten years since the age of 40
Out of Employment

Pensions awarded to employees of companies in economic difficulties: early retirement is possible at the latest 5 years before normal retiring age
At the age of 55 and after 35 years of contributions, or after 37 years of contributions regardless of age Source: European Commission Missoc 2001.
